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TORT LAW-SPOLIATORS BEWARE, BUT FEAR NOT AN INDEPENDENT
CIVIL SUIT. Goff v. Harold Ives Trucking Co., 342 Ark. 143, 27 S.W.3d
387 (2000).
I. INTRODUCTION
A machine part snaps, causing the machine to malfunction. A worker
is injured. The original part is disposed of, and a replacement part has the
machine uiS and running within hours. A patient dies during surgery. The
notes of the attending physicians are either missing or incomplete when the
patient's family requests them. In both instances, and regardless of whether
lost unintentionally, negligently, or intentionally, the unavailability of
critical pieces of evidence may hamper potential parties in civil suits. What
options remain for these parties?
Spoliation generally means failure to preserve property for use by
another as evidence in litigation.' A number of potential remedies exist for
parties prejudiced by the unavailability of evidence due to spoliation.! Only
limited remedies are available to some victims3 of spoliation in Arkansas,
however, following Goff v. Harold Ives Trucking Co.4 In that case, the
Arkansas Supreme Court declined to adopt an independent tort cause of
action for first-party spoliation.5
This note begins with the facts of Goff, followed by a brief review of
non-tort remedies available to parties injured by spoliation. An examination
of tort causes of action independent of the underlying claim follows,
including a sampling of decisions involving the tort claims in a variety of
jurisdictions. The note concludes with an analysis of the court's reasoning in
Goffand a discussion of the significance of the court's refusal to recognize
first-party spoliation as an independent tort in Arkansas.
1. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434,
436 (Minn. 1990) (quoting County of Solana v. Delancy, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721, 724 n.4 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989)).
2. The remedies, such as jury inferences, sanctions, and criminal penalties are described
infra Part III.
3. The author uses the term "some victims" because the court limited its holding to first-
party spoliation. See Goff v. Harold Ives Trucking Co., 342 Ark. 143, 27 S.W.3d 387 (2000).
When the spoliator is not a party to the underlying claim-wherein missing evidence is
prejudicial-the spoliation is termed "third-party." See MARGARET M. KOESEL ET AL.,
SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN
CIvIL LITIGATION 64-67 (Daniel F. Gourash ed., 2000) (citing Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d
429 (Ala. 2000); Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846 (D.C. 1998); Oliver v. Stimson
Lumber Co., 993 P.2d I 1 (Mont. 1999) in concluding that a cause of action against third-party
spoliators is a recent trend); see also Steffen Nolte, The Spoliation Tort: An Approach to
Underlying Principles, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 351, 381-94 (1995) (describing categories of third-
party spoliators and their duty to preserve evidence).




On December 2, 1997, Lisa Goff' suffered serious injuries when her
automobile collided with a tractor-trailer driven by an employee of Harold
Ives Trucking Co., Inc. (Ives).7 Suspecting that the truck driver may have
exceeded federal limits' on hours of service,9 Goffs attorney requested that
Ives's claims adjuster provide Goff with the truck driver's "hours of service"
records (logs).'" The claims adjuster assured Goff's attorney that Ives had the
logs, but refused to turn them over short of litigation."I
Goff brought a negligence suit in federal district court," serving
pleadings and discovery requests on Ives on May 18, 1998.1 Ives still did not
produce the driver logs requested, 14 its safety director later testifying that the
6. Lisa Goff's husband was also a party in the subsequent suits, but he recovered no
damages in federal court. See Appellee's Response Brief at 1, Goffv. Harold Ives Trucking Co.,
342 Ark. 143, 27 S.W.3d 387 (2000) (No. 99-01420). Throughout this note, appellant is
referred to in the singular.
7. Goff, 324 Ark. at 144, 27 S.W.3d at 387. Goff s injuries included head injuries,
fractured ribs, and multiple-organ bruising. Tim Pareti, Spoiled Cargo, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2001,
at 26.
8. Federal regulations limit the maximum allowable driving time for drivers of
commercial motor vehicles as follows: ten hours driving following eight hours off duty; no
driving after being on duty for fifteen hours following eight hours off duty; and no driving after
having been on duty seventy hours in any eight consecutive days. 49 C.F.R. § 395.3 (2000).
9. Pareti, supra note 7, at 26.
10. Abstract and Brief for the Appellant at 21, Goffv. Harold Ives Trucking Co., 342 Ark.
143, 27 S.W.3d 387 (2000) (No. 99-01420). Commercial drivers are required to keep a daily
record of their duty status (including time driving and time off duty) and provide these records
to the employer motor carrier. 49 C.F.R. § 395.8 (2000). The carrier must maintain the logs for
six months after receipt. Id. Goff requested the logs in April 1998, less than five months after
the accident. See Abstract and Brief for the Appellant at 21, Goff(No. 99-01420).
11. Abstract and Brief for the Appellant at 21, Goff(No. 99-01420).
12. Id Goff sued in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
based on diversity of citizenship. See id.
13. Goff, 342 Ark. at 144, 27 S.W.3d at 387. Goff's attorney's filing of the federal
complaint was timed to ensure access to the November driver logs within the federally-
mandated carrier maintenance period. Telephone Interview with Bruce L. Mulkey, Partner, The
Mulkey Attorneys Group, P.A. (Mar. 7, 2001).
14. Abstract and Brief for the Appellant at 21, Goff(No. 99-01420). Goff sought the logs
for November 1, 1997 through the date of the accident. Id.
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logs had been destroyed.'5 Goff amended her complaint to include a count
of spoliation. 6
In the meantime, Goff obtained evidence that Ives might have been
over-dispatching the driver involved in the accident. 7 Goff maintained that
such conduct was grossly negligent and showed a conscious disregard for
public safety,' 8 and further amended her complaint to seek punitive
damages.' 9 However, the federal court would not allow the claim for punitive
damages to go to the jury,20 so Goff voluntarily nonsuited the spoliation
count."' With Ives having admitted liability for the accident, the jury returned
a verdict in favor of Goff, awarding compensatory damages on her original
negligence claim.22
15. Id. Goff stipulated that the logs for the three to four days prior to the accident were lost
at the accident site, but not the logs for the earlier November dates. Telephone Interview with
Bruce L. Mulkey, supra note 13. In orderto prove conscious disregard of regulations and safety
by over-dispatching, plaintiffs required records for much more than the few days before the
accident. Id.
16. Abstract and Brief for the Appellant at 21, Goff(No. 99-01420). Not only was Ives
required to maintain the records per federal regulations, but the company was also aware of
Goff's need for the logs to investigate her claims properly. Id
17. Id. at 21-22. Within months of the accident, Goff found the truck driver's personal
journal. Telephone Interview with Bruce L. Mulkey, supra note 13. Entries in the driver's
journal indicated to Goff's attorney that the driver may have exceeded the federally-imposed
maximum driving time in the days preceding the accident. Id.
18. Abstract and Brief for the Appellant at 18, Goff.(No. 99-01420) (quoting from
telephone conference on a motion to reconsider a denial of Ives's motion to dismiss the
spoliation count).
19. Id. at 22.
20. Id. Without the logs, Goff was not able to prove over-dispatching and the claim for
punitive damages, so the district court granted judgment as a matter of law on that claim. Id at
15 (quoting the district court's finding that "there's no evidence that the company encouraged
or even condoned excessive driving by its employees .... There was a policy in effect, and that
belies a conscious disregard for the consequences here."). The district court judge also excluded
the evidence of spoliation since Ives admitted liability and the judge did not think that the
spoliation itself entitled Goff to punitive damages. Id at 18-19 (quoting from telephone
conference on motion to reconsider a denial of Ives's motion to dismiss the spoliation count).
21. See Goff, 342 Ark. at 145,27 S.W.3d at 388; see also Telephone Interview with Bruce
L. Mulkey, supra note 13 (describing the nonsuit as a tactical move made following the federal
judge's refusal to allow a punitive damages claim to go to the jury). The federal judge refused
to dismiss the spoliation count, noting: "[T]here may be a spoliation cause of action here if you
have a violation of a statute. That's what Wilson v. Beloit [869 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1989)]
stands for." Abstract and Brief for the Appellant at 19, Goff (No. 99-01420) (quoting from
telephone conference on motion to reconsider a denial of Ives's motion to dismiss the spoliation
count). But see Goffv. Harold Ives Trucking Co., 342 Ark. 143, 145, 27 S.W.3d 387, 388
(2000) (stating "the federal trial judge refused to let the Goffs submit a claim for punitive
damages based on spoliation, and as a result, they took a voluntary nonsuit on the spoliation
count").
22. Goff, 342 Ark. at 143, 27 S.W.3d at 388. The damages award was $100,000.
Appellee's Response Brief at 1, Goff(No. 99-01420).
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Thinking an Arkansas state court should still address her spoliation
claim,23 Goff subsequently filed a complaint in Pulaski County Circuit Court
based solely on that count.24 Ives moved to dismiss for failure to state a
claim,25 asserting that Arkansas does not recognize the tort of spoliation of
evidence, and, alternately, that Goff's recovery on the negligence action in
federal court precluded her recovery on a spoliation claim.26 Following a
hearing, the trial court dismissed Goff's complaint.
Goff appealed the trial court's decision.2" In Goff v. Harold Ives
Trucking Co., 29 the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of the count, declining to adopt an independent tort of first-party
spoliation of evidence.30
III. BACKGROUND
Spoliation includes the destruction, concealment, or alteration of
evidence, proof of which may weigh against the party responsible." Because
spoliation inhibits truthseeking and fairness, risks the integrity ofthe judicial
23. Abstract and Brief for the Appellant at 30, Goff(No. 99-01420).
24. Goff, 342 Ark. at 145, 27 S.W.3d at 388.
25. See ARK. R. Civ. P. 12(bX6).
26. Goff, 342 Ark. at 145, 27 S.W.3d at 388. Ives's claim preclusion theory rests on the
requirement, in some of the jurisdictions recognizing a spoliation tort, of actual injury
evidenced by loss of the underlying suit. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d
313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (dismissing a spoliation claim by reasoning that an $860,000
recovery indicated that the evidence destruction was not injurious). The Goffcourt did not reach
this alternate claim. See Goff, 342 Ark. 143, 27 S.W.3d 387.
27. Goff, 342 Ark. at 145,27 S.W.3d at 388. The trial court judge questioned Goff about
damages, the status of the independent tort in other jurisdictions, and why the claim was
nonsuited at the federal level. Abstract and Brief for the Appellant at 27-30, Goff (No. 99-
01420). He concluded that there was no need for the cause of action and that its speculative
nature made it inadvisable. Id. at 31-32.
28. Abstract and Brief for the Appellant at iii-iv, Goff(No. 99-01420). Goff listed the
following points on appeal: spoliation is an issue of first impression for the appellate courts; the
appeal is of substantial public interest; and the appeal involves a significant issue requiring
clarification and development of the law. Id. The appeal was to the Arkansas Court of Appeals,
but was reassigned to the Arkansas Supreme Court as permitted by the Rules of the Supreme
Court. See ARK. Sup. CT. R. 1-2(b).
29. 342 Ark. 143, 27 S.W.3d 387(2000).
30. Seeid. at 151,27 S.W.3d at 391.
31. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1409 (7th ed. 1999). Many court opinions cited in this
note, including Goff, however, quote Black's sixth edition, which defines spoliation as "the
intentional destruction of evidence and when it is established, [the] fact finder may draw [an]
inference that evidence destroyed was unfavorable to the party responsible for its spoliation."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1401 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). But see Joseph J. Ortego &
Glen M. Vogel, Spoliation of Evidence, 2000 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY 257, 262
(stating that evolving law includes negligent destruction of evidence as spoliation).
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process of dispute resolution, and threatens to undermine the adversarial
system,32 a variety of remedies have developed to control it.33 This section
first describes the non-tort remedies, then continues with a discussion of the
independent tort cause of action.
A. Non-Tort Remedies for Parties Prejudiced by Spoliation
1. The Spoliation Inference
The principle of spoliation resulting in a presumption of guilt "has
existed from time immemorial,"I preserved in every system of laws since the
writing of the Bible.3 Failure to produce evidence which would clarify the
facts indicates "as the most natural inference, that the party fears to do so;
and this fear is some evidence that the circumstance or document or witness,
if brought, would have exposed facts unfavorable to the party."
36
The Latin maxim "omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorem" ("all things
are presumed against a wrongdoer") provides for an inference of guilt arising
from the destruction of presumably incriminating evidence-the "spoliation
inference."3 Early English cases exemplify this inference, such as the
familiar law-school property case in which the judge instructed thejury that
it should consider the value of the finest gem to be the damages unless the
defendant jeweler produced the actual gem.3 The case was an action in
trover, where the plaintiff chimney-sweep won against the jeweler who
32. See JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUcnON OF EVIDENCE 14-18 (1989). Accurate
fact-finding is essential to a process aimed at promoting truth. Id at 14. Since access to relevant
evidence is not equal, unfairness can be prevented by disallowing all parties to destroy
evidence. Id. at 16. Gorelick suggests that legal control of spoliation legitimizes the judicial
process. See id. at 16-18.
33. Id. at 5.
34. BuRR W. JONES, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES 145
(James M. Henderson ed., 2d ed. 1926).
35. Id ("Cursed be he that removeth his neighbor's landmark.") (quoting Deuteronomy
27:17).
36. 2 JOHN HENRY WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 285 (Chadbourn rev. 1979) (emphasis added).
Wigmore distinguishes conduct as that which indicates consciousness of"weakness ofthe cause
in general" or consciousness of "the weakness of a specific element in the cause"; he uses as
examples destruction of evidence (for the former) and failure to produce a document (for the
latter type of conduct). Id. § 277 (emphasis omitted). Later in the text, Wigmore specifically
includes destruction of chattels as well as documents in his description of conduct for which the
propriety of an adverse inference "has always been assumed." Id § 291.
37. GORELICKETAL., supra note 32, at 5-6.
38. Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722). The judge instructed "that unless
the defendant did produce the jewel, and shew it not to be of the finest water, they should




failed to produce the evidence, a gemstone entrusted to the jeweler for an
appraisal.39 The court did not know with certainty the value of the gemstone,
but concluded that the spoliator, as the wrongdoer, bore the risk of a
disproportionate valuation.'
The spoliation inference has survived to the present.4' Thus, the conduct
of a party destroying potentially relevant evidence should entitle the
opposing party to an instruction that the spoliation discredits the adversary's
case and corroborates the proponent's case.42 The right to an instruction
carries with it a corresponding right to argue the inferences.43
2. Sanctions
Premised on the court's inherent power to control proceedings, and
particularized with the advent of civil procedure discovery rules," a variety
of sanctions have emerged to punish and deter spoliation as well as
compensate the victim.45 What follows is a brief review of types of sanctions
a court may impose for acts of spoliation.
a. Issue preclusion
Prohibiting introduction of testimony based on the missing evidence is
perhaps the most common sanction imposed on a spoliator.' Issue preclu-
sion4' often prevents testimony from an expert witness, especially where that
expert was responsible for the destruction of the evidence.4" Making an
39. Id.
40. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 32, at 6.
41. See, e.g., Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that
permitting a jury to draw an adverse inference against a party responsible for spoliation is
within the trial court's discretionary powers); Anthony v. State, 332 Ark. 595,600,967 S.W.2d
552, 554 (1998) (quoting Professor Wigmore's passage that includes spoliation as a reason for
the inference); see also GORELICK ET AL., supra note 32, at 59-64; id. at 88-90 (Supp. 2001)
(indicating that the United States Supreme Court, most federal circuits, and nearly all states
have considered the spoliation inference, and citing each jurisdiction's leading case or cases).
42. See 2 CHARLEs T.McCoRhfcK, EviDENCE 181-82 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
43. Id at 182.
44. See KOESEL ETAL., supra note 3, at 28-32 (describing sources of the court's authority
to sanction spoliation). See also GOREuLICK ET AL., supra note 32, at 72-87, for a discussion of
the courts' sanctioning powers when spoliation violates a court order, occurs absent a court
order, and otherwise.
45. GORELICKETAL., supra note 32, at 5.
46. Ortego & Vogel, supra note 31, at 265.
47. Issue preclusion prohibits use of specific evidence or bringing selected issues before




expert's testimony inadmissible could end the suit, as it did inFire Insurance
Exchange v. Zenith Radio Corp.49 In that case, the plaintiff's expert
determined that a fire had originated inside a television set, but did not
preserve the television." Two years later, after the plaintiff had disposed of
the television set and failed to meet the defendant's requests for information,
on motion by the defendant for sanctions, the court excluded the testimony
of the plaintiffs expert witness and granted summary judgment for the
defendant.5
Issue preclusion is certainly not limited to testimony by experts,52 nor
is its application reserved to either plaintiffs or defendants." Furthermore,
granting such a sanction may have its own preclusive effect in subsequent
litigation, thereby dispensing with the requirement of proving the common
act of spoliation. 4
b. Dismissal or default judgment
Though used only in the "most egregious circumstances," dismissal or
default judgment is within the court's inherent power when faced with
spoliation." Courts impose this "ultimate penalty" in cases in which the
missing evidence relates to a dispositive material issue or bears on such a
number of material issues that the proper sanctions would equate to a
directed verdict.", Factors considered before imposing a dismissal sanction
49. 747 P.2d 911 (Nev. 1987).
50. Id. at 912.
51. Id. at 913. Without the testimony of the expert, the plaintiff did not have sufficient
evidence to prove its case. Id.
52. See, e.g., Yi Min Ren v. Prof'I Steam-Cleaning, Inc., 706 N.Y.S.2d 169 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2000) (mem.) (precluding testimony by the owner as to the condition of a ladder that he
had failed to preserve for plaintiffs examination).
53. Ortego & Vogel, supra note 31, at 261 (suggesting that "spoliation is not a 'plaintiff'
or 'defendant' issue exclusively").
54. See GORmLICK Er AL., supra note 32, at 174 (Supp. 2001). Gorelick cites Syanon
Church v. United States, 820 F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1987), as a case in point. In an earlier,
unrelated case, plaintiff Synanon was found to have committed fraud on the court by willfully
destroying evidence that would have supported defendant's assertion that Synanon was not a
non-profit organization. Synanon Found., Inc. v. Bernstein, 503 A.2d 1254 (D.C. App. 1986).
Dismissal of that case was upheld. Id. at 1262. In a subsequent action by Synanon seeking a
declaratory judgment of its tax-exempt status, issue preclusion prevented Synanon from arguing
that it had not willfully destroyed evidence, resulting in the dismissal of that case as well.
Synanon Church, 820 F.2d at 428. Gorelick notes that a sanction in a second lawsuit could
differ from that in a first, depending on the prejudice suffered by the victim of the spoliation.
55. Laurie Kindel & Kai Richter, Spoliation of Evidence: Will the New Millenium See a
Further Expansion ofSanctions for the Improper Destruction ofEvidence?, 27 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 687, 693 (2000).
56. Donald H. Flanary Jr. & Bruce M. Flowers, Spoliation of Evidence: Let's Have a Rule
2001] 239
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include the spoliator's willfulness, the extent of prejudice if a lesser sanction
were used, and the comparative severity of spoliation to dismissal. 7
Additional factors include the irreparable nature of the lost evidence,
whether the sanction is unfairly punitive to a party whose attorney is the
spoliator, and if deterrence of future spoliation by the parties is sought."
Such a sanction may have a claim-preclusive effect, as well, where a
dismissal with prejudice implicates the doctrine of res judicata.5 9
c. Monetary fines
Monetary sanctions may reflect the costs of reconstructing evidence"
as well as attorney's fees and costs associated with willful concealment,
including those for handling evidentiary and sanction motions.6' These
sanctions may be substantial, particularly if a court seeks to punish and
deter.62
d. Notification of attorney misconduct
Attorneys who spoliate evidence put themselves, as well as their clients,
at risk.63 Aside from the sanctions that may affect the case and monetary
sanctions that may be imposed "jointly and severally" on counsel and
client," attorneys may face disciplinary actions based on rules of profes-
sional conduct.65 One court has suggested that discipline may reach to
in Response, 60 DEF. CoUNS. J. 553, 555 (1993).
57. Jay E. Rivlin, Note, Recognizing an Independent Tort Will Spoil a Spoliator's
Splendor, 26 HoFsTRA L. REv. 1003, 1011 (1998).
58. Id.
59. GORELICK ET AL., supra note 32, at 174 (Supp. 200 1) (describing White v. Harris, 23
F. Supp. 2d 611 (D. Md. 1998), as such a case).
60. GORELICK El AL., supra note 32, at 119.
61. Kindel & Richter, supra note 55, at 695.
62. Id. at 695-96. Kindel and Richter cite instances where corporate defendants were
sanctioned one million dollars for failing to preserve evidence and 1.5 million dollars for
intentionally withholding evidence. Id. at 696 & n.47. These exceptional sanctions were
predicated on a failure to follow a court order and willfulness of behavior, respectively. See id.
63. Id. at 701.
64. See, e.g., Thomas E. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 522, 527 (2d Cir. 1990)
(finding support for district court's determination of equal responsibility of attorney and client
in failing to comply with discovery requests and court orders, and in assessment of monetary
sanctions of nearly $22,000).
65. See, e.g., HOWARD W. BRILL, PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS 213-14 (2000).
Arkansas Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 includes a definition of misconduct as "engag[ing]
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; [or] engag[ing] in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." Id.
240 [Vol, 24
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suspension or disbarment of attorneys participating in destruction or
suppression of evidence.'
3. Criminal Penalties
With the dawn of obstruction of justice statutes in 1831,67 Congress
affirmatively granted federal courts Jhe power to punish contempt; courts
have since interpreted this power to include punishing the destruction of
evidence.6 Though several states copied the federal obstruction of justice
statute,69 the regulation of evidence destruction through state statutes varies
among states.7° Likewise, the application of penal sanctions varies.7'
However, for the purpose of this note, the existence of statutes and
application of criminal penalties provide yet another possible non-tort
remedy for spoliation.
B. An Independent Tort Cause of Action as a Remedy for Spoliation
Some courts have determined that the harm to a party's underlying
claim caused by the destruction of evidence supports an action in tort. This
section describes the rise of an independent tort cause of action for
66. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511,518 (Cal. 1998). The harsh
disciplinary action extended from readings of the California Business and Professional Code
section 6106 (commission of an act involving dishonesty) and Rules of Professional Conduct
for attorneys (prohibiting suppression of evidence legally obligated to produce). Id.
67. GORELICK ETAL., supra note 32, at 8. An 1831 act designed to limit the power of the
court to punish contempt included a section establishing the crime of obstruction ofjustice. Id
at 172. The successor to this act is found at 18 U.S.C. § 1503, the federal obstruction ofjustice
statute, providing that "[w]hoever corruptly... influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors
to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice" is subject to fine or
imprisonment or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994).
68. GORELICK ET AL., supra note 32, at 173. Though § 1503 does not explicitly refer to
spoliation, courts have construed it to extend to prohibiting "willful destruction of evidence
relevant to pending judicial proceedings." Id
69. Id at 9 (citing Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress over
Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts, 37 HARv. L. REV. 1010, 1027
n.77 (1924)).
70. Id. at 190. Gorelick categorizes states as those having statutes prohibiting obstruction
ofjustice generally, those having statutes specifically prohibiting destruction of evidence, and
those having either no statutes prohibiting the destruction of evidence or having extremely
narrow prohibitions. Id
71. Id. at 198-99. Gorelick describes some statutes as applying only if destroyed evidence
relates to a criminal proceeding, or as being rarely applicable to civil litigation. Id. See also
KOESEL ErAL., supra note 3, at 75-172, for state-by-state descriptions of criminal statutes and
applications in civil lawsuits.
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spoliation, followed by a discussion of some jurisdictions' responses to such
tort claims.
1. California's Smith v. Superior Court and the Birth of an
Independent Cause ofAction
Virtually every court opinion addressing spoliation as an independent
cause of action includes a summary ofSmith v. Superior Court,7" decided by
a California Court of Appeal in 1984. In that case, an automobile dealer-
ship-which had customized and sold a van involved in- a serious acci-
dent-agreed to maintain the automobile parts removed from the van
following the accident, but subsequently could not produce the parts for the
plaintiffs' examination in preparing their personal injury claim.' Noting that
the Smiths' ability to obtain compensatory damages for their injuries was
prejudiced by the loss of the automobile parts,74 the appellate court reasoned
that a novel tort might be appropriate.75 The court also suggested that a prior
72. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). The Smith court did not refer to previous tort
cases; subsequently, decisions following Smith "assume that the spoliation tort was invented by
the Smith court." GORELICK ET AL., supra note 32, at 141. Gorelick presents a brief history
suggesting that the spoliation tort has a much longer history, even back to eighteenth century
English common law. Id. at 140-41 (citing Alvin E. Evans, Torts to Expectancies in Decedents'
Estates, 93 U. PA. L. REv. 187, 196-99 (1944)); see also Nolte, supra note 3, at 357-59
(summarizing case law prior to Smith).
73. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 831. Plaintiffs Phyllis Smith and her husband originally
sought recovery against four defendants-the auto dealership, the manufacturer of the van, a
department store that had recently serviced the van, and the driver of the van-for Phyllis's
personal injuries and her husband's loss of consortium. See Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court,
741 P.2d 124, 127 (Cal. 1987) (reviewing the facts and litigation background as presented to
a trial court in a related hearing).
74. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
75. Id. at 832-37. The court extensively quoted from Professor Prosser regarding the
recognition of and naming of new torts. See id. at 832 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 1 (4th ed. 1971)). "New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and the
progress of the common law is marked by many cases of first impression, in which the court
has struck out boldly to create a new cause of action . . . ." Id. The Smith court's ruling on the
appropriateness of a new tort was based on considerations of prior California case law, as well
as Professor Prosser's criteria: "[w]hen it becomes clear that the plaintiff's interests are entitled
to legal protection" and "[t]he common threat [sic] woven into all torts is the idea of
unreasonable interference with the interests of others." Id. (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS § 1 (4th ed. 1971)).
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California Supreme Court case, Williams v. State,76 recognized that if a duty
to preserve evidence exists, a negligence cause of action could be stated.""
The court declared only partially sound the defense's contention that
California's misdemeanor evidence-tampering statute preempted a cause of
action for intentional spoliation."' Noting that the loss of evidence by
intentional destruction could result in a "devastating" prevention of the
injured plaintiff from seeking any remedy for the underlying claim"9 and
suggesting that a misdemeanor conviction was small when weighed against
the possibility of a substantial monetary damages award, the court stated that
the effect of the penal statute would be of "minimal deterrence."'
Saving the question of uncertainty of damages for last, theSmith court
acknowledged that the Smiths, having not yet gone to trial, might yet recover
damages in the underlying case." Ordinarily, to recover damages, the
plaintiff must prove those damages with "reasonable certainty.""R2 However,
the court quoted the United States Supreme Court holding in Story Parch-
ment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,' which declared that
[w]here the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment
of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of
fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person,
and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts."
76. 664 P.2d 137 (Cal. 1983). The Williams case was based, in part, on a failure by the
highway patrol to properly handle evidence and sufficiently investigate an automobile accident.
Id. The supreme court's opinion primarily addressed the issues of duty and state immunity, but
concluded that fairness to the plaintiff required permitting her to amend her complaint to
attempt state a cause of action. Id. at 143.
77. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33 (citing Williams, 664 P.2d 137). But see Cedars Sinai
Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998) (disapproving Smith and denying
recognition of the tort in Williams).
78. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 834. The defendant likened intentional spoliation to perjury,
and, as an obstruction ofjustice issue, suggested that the wrong was against the public and not
against an individual. Id. The court described at length procedural and policy distinctions
between civil and criminal actions, noting that "[a] criminal prosecution is not concerned in any
way with compensation of the injured individual.... A civil action for a tort, on the other hand,
.. [should] compensate [the victim] for the damage he has suffered, at the expense of the
wrongdoer." Id.
79. Id at 835.
80. Id The court also noted that in the 112-year history of the state's obstruction ofjustice
statute, it knew of no prosecutions for violation of that statute where the destroyed evidence was
only relevant to a prospective civil action. See id. at 835.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDrEs 150 (1973)).
83. 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
84. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835 (quoting Story Parchment Co., 282 U.S. at 563).
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Likening the Smiths' claim to the recognized tort of intentional interference
with a prospective business advantage, the court held that the prospective
success in a products liability claim was an interest for which the courts must
offer protection, even though the damages may not be stated with certainty. 5
Thus was "created" the independent tort cause of action for spoliation and
the status of Smith as the landmark case for this tort.'
2. Developments After Smith
The Smith v. Superior Courte7 decision was the first among similar tort
claims in at least thirty-six jurisdictions." Results have varied as follows:
recognizing a tort claim for either negligent spoliation or intentional
spoliation; recognizing both as causes of action; refusing to recognize either;
and, in most cases, not deciding the issue at all." This section continues by
distinguishing the elements of intentional spoliation and negligent spoliation,
followed by summaries of some of the holdings since Smith.
Elements of the tort of intentional spoliation generally include "(1)
pending or probable litigation; (2) knowledge by the spoliator that
litigation is pending or probable; (3) willful destruction of evidence; (4)
intent to interfere with the victim's prospective civil suit; (5) a causal
relationship between the evidence destruction and inability to prove the
lawsuit; and (6) damages."0 The elements of negligent spoliation include
"(1) the existence of a potential civil action; (2) a legal or contractual duty
to preserve evidence relevant to the potential action; (3) destruction of that
evidence; (4) significant impairment in the ability to prove the lawsuit; (5)
a causal relationship between the destruction and inability to prove the
lawsuit; [and] (6) damages." '
85. Id. at 837.
86. Nolte, supra note 3, at 359.
87. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
88. GORELICK ETAL., supra note 32, at 180 (Supp. 2001).
89. See id. at 180-83.
90. Kindel & Richter, supra note 55, at 697 (citing Bart S. Wilhoit, Comment, Spoliation
of Evidence: The Viability of Four Emerging Torts, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 631, 644 (1998)).




a. Recognition of an independent tort
A number of jurisdictions explicitly recognize the tort of spoliation.92
Citing the Smith v. Superior Court93 and Williams v. State9' cases from
California, a Florida appeals court reversed ajudgment on the pleadings by
declaring that a cause of action existed when a hospital failed to maintain
records needed by the plaintiff in her medical malpractice claim. 95 The court,
noting that administrative regulations imposed a duty on the hospital to
maintain the records, found the breach caused plaintiff damages, evidenced
by her loss of her medical negligence lawsuit.'
In Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc.,' the New Mexico Supreme Court
examined prior case law and tort principles" in deciding to recognize a cause
of action for intentional spoliation of evidence. 9 At the same time, the court
declined to recognize a separate tort of negligent destruction of potential
evidence, finding adequate remedies under traditional negligence
principles."' °
On certification from a federal district court, the Ohio Supreme Court
responded to a spoliation inquiry as follows: "A cause of action exists in tort
92. GORELICK ET AL., supra note 32, at 180 (Supp. 200 1). The author identifies eight such
jurisdictions: Alabama, Alaska, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Montana, New Mexico,
and Ohio. Id.
93. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. CL App. 1984).
94. 664 P.2d 137 (Cal. 1983).
95. Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). Plaintiff's husband
died during triple bypass surgery, and plaintiff charged the anesthesiologist with negligence.
Id. at 1309. After failing to provide plaintiff with requested medical records, plaintiff charged
the hospital with negligence per se based on Florida statutes requiring the provision of the
records. Id.
96. Id. at 1313. The court declared the following:
If, as in [the California cases], an action for failure to preserve evidence or
destruction of evidence lies against a party who has no connection to the lost
prospective litigation, then, a fortiori, an action should lie against a defendant
which, as here, stands to benefit by the fact that the prospect of successful litigation
against it has disappeared along with the crucial evidence.
Id. at 1312.
97. 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995). The case arose following disassembly and loss of parts of
a "manlift" from which plaintiff fell in the course other employment in a potash mine. Id. at
187. The plaintiff sought recovery from manufacturers of the manlift and its parts, in part under
the theory of products liability. See id. She asserted that Eddy Potash should have known to
preserve the manlifi and that the disassembly was meant to disrupt her case. Id.
98. Id. at 189 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1977)). "One who
intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability to the other for that injury, if his
conduct is generally culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances." Id.
99. Id. at 189-90. The court found allegations that the defendant acted intentionally to
disrupt the plaintiff's case were sufficient to state a claim for relief. Id.
100. Id. at 190.
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for interference with or destruction of evidence; ... such a claim should be
recognized between the parties to the primary action and against third
parties;... such a claim may be brought at the same time as the primary
action."'101
b. Some states pass on the chance to recognize an
independent tort
A number of states have "[left] the door open" to creating a spoliation
tort while not recognizing the tort in specific cases. 02 For example,
confronted with the independent tort claim in La Raid v. Superior Court,"°3
the Arizona Supreme Court saw no need to recognize a spoliation claim."°
The plaintiff in that case suffered physical injuries when an employee of the
defendant sprayed a toxic pesticide in the plaintiffs apartment. 5 The
injuries were exacerbated by improper medical treatment and follow-up care
premised on an intentionally, false declaration by the defendant as to the
chemicals in the pesticide."° The court found "no need to invoke esoteric
theories or recognize some new tort."'0" The court opted instead to formally
adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 322,108 and described the
actions of the defendant not as spoliation, but as failure to act reasonably in
mitigating the harm defendant caused by initially poisoning the plaintiff.'
Other states' discussions have left the recognition of a tort ambiguous
for reasons particular to the facts and decisions of the representative
courts."0 Lack of a duty to preserve evidence, especially since the spoliator
101. Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ohio 1993). The court
distinguished some of the variables present when jurisdictions consider spoliation as an
independent tort-first-party spoliator, third-party spoliator, tort claim brought along with the
underlying claim, and tort claim brought subsequent to underlying claim. See id.
102. GORELICK ET AL., supra note 32, at 181 (Supp. 2001). Gorelick identifies Arizona,
Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington and
West Virginia as jurisdictions that have declined to recognize the tort because it was not
necessary to do so under the circumstances of the cases presenting the question. Id.
103. 722 P.2d 286 (Ariz. 1986).
104. Id. at 288-90.
105. Id at 287-88.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 289.
108. An actor causing bodily harm to another has a duty to exercise reasonable care to
prevent further harm if such a danger exists. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 322
(1965).
109. See La Raia, 722P.2d 286, 290 (finding that the apartment manager's destruction of
the pesticide can caused further injury to the plaintiff).
110. See GORELICKETAL., supra note 32, at 182 (Supp. 2001). Gorelick found ambiguity
in decisions of Arkansas (citing Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 921 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1990)),
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Kansas, New Hampshire, and Wyoming. Id
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was a third party, prevented the Kansas Supreme Court from recognizing an
independent tort on the facts of a case certified from federal court inKoplin
v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc."' In Lucas v. Christiana Skating Center,
Ltd.,' 2 a Delaware trial court deemed jury instructions on the spoliation
inference and the threat of criminal penalty sufficient deterrents and
remedies in refusing to recognize both a negligent or intentional spoliation
tort claim."3
c. Some states refuse to recognize an independent
spoliation tort
Among the states refusing to create an independent tort status for
spoliation" 4 is Texas, as evidenced in Trevino v. Ortega."5 Noting that
"evolving remedies, sanctions and procedures for evidence spoliation are
available," the court stressed that improper conduct is best rectified within
the context of the underlying cause of action without an independent cause
of action arising. 16 Similarly, in Monsanto Co. v. Reed,"I7 the Kentucky
Supreme Court declined to create a new tort claim, choosing evidentiary
rules and "missing evidence" instructions as the remedies for spoliation, and
overruling an appeals court decision recognizing an independent tort.1
111. 734 P.2d 1177 (Kan. 1987). Employer's disposal of an allegedly defective T-clamp
was within its rights as owner of the clamp. The court found the disposal was legal because the
employer did not destroy the clamp in its own interest, and at the time there was no pending or
contemplated litigation with plaintiff. Id at 1181-82.
112. 722 A.2d 1247 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998). At issue was the failure of a roller skating
center to preserve a skate worn by an injured patron. Id. at 1248. Because a state trial court
decided the case, the status of the spoliation tort in Delaware is not conclusive. GORELICK El
AL., supra note 32, at 211 (Supp. 2001).
113. Lucas, 722 A.2dat 1250-51.
114. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 32, at 182-83 (Supp. 2001) (identifying five
jurisdictions that have expressly rejected the tort: California, Kentucky, Louisiana, New York,
and Texas). But see Fada Indus., Inc. v. Falchi Bldg. Co., No. 12790/99, 2001 WL 876700
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 22, 2001) (holding that a negligent spoliation cause of action may be
asserted by an insured in a third-party claim against its insurer, based upon the loss or
destruction of evidence key to the insured's defense).
115. 969 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1998). The case includes an extensive concurrence analyzing
the adequacy of non-tort remedies available in Texas trial courts. See id. at 953-61 (Baker, J.,
concurring).
116. Id. at953.
117. 950 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1997).
118. Id. at 815-16.
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3. A Close Look at California's Current Position
In the seventeen years since Smith v. Superior Court,"9 spoliation has
been a topic of a number ofjournal and law review articles.20 As mentioned
in Part III.B.2, at least thirty-six jurisdictions have considered the issue of
destruction of evidence as an independent tort.' 2' This section would be
incomplete without a second look at California, where spoliation has
recently fallen from an independent tort status.1
22
In California, the death knell sounded for the independent tort of
intentional spoliation with the supreme court decision in Cedars-Sinai
Medical Center v. Superior Court.2 1 Claiming to have never recognized tort
remedies for spoliation'24 and disapproving prior court of appeal decisions, '2"
the supreme court granted review to decide whether to recognize a tort
remedy for the intentional destruction or suppression of evidence by a party
to the underlying litigation.
26
Noting that the independent tort issue was one of "widespread
importance" and "in the public interest,"' 27 the court examined general
principles of tort law, stressing the need for a "violation of a legal duty
imposed by statute, contract or otherwise owed by the defendant to the
person injured" to support either a negligent or intentional tort claim.' The
119. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
120. See, e.g., Scott S. Katz & Anne Marie Muscaro, Spoilage of Evidence-Crimes,
Sanctions, Inferences, and Torts, 29 TORT & INs. L.J. 51 (1993); Charles R. Nesson, Incentives
to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Needfor Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOzo
L. REV. 793 (199 1); Lawrence Solum & Stephen Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control
of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085 (1987); Terry R. Spencer, Do Not Fold
Spindle or Mutilate: The Trend Towards Recognition of Spoliation as a Separate Tort, 30
IDAHO L. REV. 37 (1993).
121. GORELICKETAL., supra note 32, at 180 (Supp. 2001).
122. See Jerrold Abeles & Robert J. Tyson, Spoil Sport, L.A. LAW., May 1999, at 41.
"[T]he California Supreme Court wiped out 14 years of judicial precedent supporting the tort
of intentional spoliation. . . ." Id at 42.
123. 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998). The case involved nonproduction of fetal monitor strips by
the defendant hospital; the plaintiff's amended complaint sought punitive damages for
intentional spoliation, alleging that the hospital destroyed the missing records to frustrate the
plaintiff's malpractice claim. Id at 512-13.
124. Id. at 513 n.1. The court stated that "[c]ontrary to plaintiffs contention, we did not
recognize the existence of a spoliation tort remedy in Williams v. State of California." Id.
125. The court specifically mentioned Willard v. Caterpillar, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 607
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995), and Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). Id
at 513. Willard included a lengthy discussion of spoliation as a tort, noting prior California
cases recognizing the cause of action. Willard, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 908-09. See supra Part III.B. I
for a discussion of Smith.
126. Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d at 513.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 514-15 (citing 5 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALEFORNIA LAW 61 (9th ed. 1988)).
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court, however, stated that the final determination of whether to recognize
a tort remedy required weighing policy considerations as well.
29
Turning to the policy considerations, the court held that spoliation's
effects on fhirness,justice, and increased costs were insufficient to justify the
creation of tort liability.130 It cited three particular concerns: (1) the conflict
between creating the tort remedy and policy against derivative tort remedies
for litigation-related misconduct, (2) the strength of non-tort remedies for
destruction of evidence, and (3) the uncertainty of the harm involved.'13 The
court ended its analysis with an accounting of the "costs" of litigating
spoliation claims. 32 According to the court, the increased deterrence to
spoliators would not adequately offset the risk of erroneous findings of
liability, subsequent imposition of indirect costs in preservation of otherwise
valueless things "just in case," costs of litigating meritless claims, and
potential for jury confusion or inconsistent results.
33
In concluding its opinion, the court repeated that existing remedies will
usually be effective in ensuring fair decisions in underlying claims and held
that "there is no tort remedy for the intentional spoliation of evidence by a
party to the cause of action... [when] the spoliation victim knows or should
have known of the alleged spoliation before the trial or other decision on the
merits of the underlying action."''
IV. REASONING
In Goff v. Harold Ives Trucking Co., 3 the Arkansas Supreme Court
held that Arkansas would not recognize first-party spoliation as an independ-
129. Id. at 515.
130. Id. The court stated, "We must also determine whether a tort remedy for the intentional
first party spoliation of evidence would ultimately create social benefits exceeding those created
by existing remedies for such conduct, and outweighing any costs or burdens it would impose."
Id.
131. Id. The court thoroughly examined these three areas, (1) holding that a remedy for
litigation-related misconduct should not create a "spiral of lawsuits" and should recognize the
need for finality in adjudication; (2) holding that the non-tort remedies ofevidentiary inference,
discovery sanctions, disciplinary sanctions for attorneys involved, and criminal penalties seem
sufficient; and (3) distinguishing an "uncertainty of the fact of harm" from mere uncertainty of
amount of damages. The issue of harm to damages was too speculative for a tort remedy to
solve. See id. at 515-19.
132. Id. at 519-20.
133. Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d at 519-20.
134. Id. at 521. Some commentators see room for negligent spoliation claims, cautioning
that the California Supreme Court would likely require the "legal duty" it mentioned at the start
of its analysis. See, e.g., Abeles & Tyson, supra note 122, at 49.
135. 342 Ark. 143, 27 S.W.3d 387 (2000).
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ent tort, 3 6 affirming a circuit court's dismissal for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.'37 Finding the recognition of a new tort
"unnecessary and unwise," Arkansasjoined those jurisdictions that have held
that existing non-tort remedies are sufficient to remedy acts of spoliation . 38
The court began its analysis with an identification of the California
Court of Appeal's Smith v. Superior Court39 holdings: In Smith, the court
held that the harm of spoliation can be likened to that of intentional
interference with an economic advantage, and the probable expectancy of a
damage award in a civil action is an interest courts should protect. 40 The
court next identified jurisdictions that have adopted this approach in
recognizing an independent tort, citing cases from Florida, Alaska, New
Jersey, the District of Columbia, Ohio, and New Mexico.
14'
Noting that California no longer recognizes spoliation as an independ-
ent tort, 42 the Arkansas court's analysis continued with an examination of
the reasons for California's reversal, including its public policy of using
nontort remedies-such as the spoliation inference, discovery sanctions,
lawyer discipline, and criminal penalties-for litigation-related
misconduct. 143 The Arkansas court stated that the spoliation inference has
been recognized in Arkansas, 44 and that Arkansas has discovery sanctions
similar to those described in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior
Court. 41 Reflecting on the Cedars-Sinai court's discussion of attorney
136. Id at 151, 27 S.W.3d at 391.
137. Id at 145, 27 S.W.3d at 388. The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is
allowed pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
138. Id at 150-51, 27 S.W.3d at 391. Non-tort remedies are described supra, Part III.A.
139. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
140. Goff, 342 Ark. at 146, 27 S.W.3d at 388.
141. Id., 27 S.W.3d at 388-89.
142. Id. at 146, 27 S.W.3d at 389 (citing Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954
P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998)).
143. Id at 147-49, 27 S.W.3d at 389-90.
144. Id at 147, 27 S.W.3d at 389 (citing Carr v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 384 F.
Supp. 821 (W.D. Ark. 1974)).
145. Id at 147-48, 27 S.W.3d at 389-90. The discovery sanctions specifically mentioned
included "monetary sanctions, contempt sanctions, issue sanctions... , evidentiary sanctions
... and terminating sanctions." Id at 147, 27 S.W.3d at 389 (quoting Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d
at 517-18). Sanctions by an Arkansas court where an action is pending may include orders
establishing facts, orders refusing to allow support or opposition to claims or defenses, orders
prohibiting introduction of evidence, orders striking pleadings or parts of pleadings, dismissal
of actions or default judgments, and contempt of court charges. See ARK. R. Civ. P. 37(b). The
court may also order payment of reasonable expenses arising from the failure to obey discovery
orders. Id In a footnote, the supreme court noted that Gof's attorney had not sought discovery
sanctions against Ives. Goff, 342 Ark. at 148 n.3, 27 S.W.3d at 390 n.3. In fact, one court-
imposed sanction was levied on Ives at the federal trial, resulting in a $250 fine for failure to




discipline and criminal penalties as additional remedies for spoliation, the
Arkansas court stated that Arkansas law provides deterrents to destruction
of evidence in both the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct1 46 and the
Arkansas Criminal Code. 4" Finally, after quoting extensively from Cedars-
Sinai, the Arkansas Supreme Court expressed concern with the speculative
nature of damages and whether and what injury Goff suffered as a result of
the loss of the driver logs. 48 Goff's success in the underlying negligence
action bolstered the court's concern regarding the nature and extent of
damages.
49
In formulating its conclusion that recognizing first-party spoliation as
an independent cause of action is not necessary, the Goff court made three
additional comments. First, despite Goff's characterization of the tort as a
"growing trend" in this country, 50 the court noted that, ofthose states' courts
considering an independent tort of spoliation, most have either expressly
rejected it or have declined to reach the question given the particular facts
of the cases presented.' Second, the court reiterated its belief that jury
inference instructions, discovery sanctions and criminal prosecution are
adequate remedies for spoliation.'52 Third, the court declared that evidence
146. See supra note 65 for the text of the rule prohibiting dishonesty, misrepresentation,
and conduct prejudicial to justice.
147. Goff, 342 Ark. at 148-49, 27 S.W.3d at 390. Arkansas's criminal statute reads as
follows:
(a) A person commits the offense of tampering with physical evidence if he
alters, destroys, suppresses, removes, or conceals any record, document, or thing
with the purpose of impairing its verity, legibility, or availability in any official
proceeding or investigation.
(b) Tampering with physical evidence is a Class D felony if the actor impairs
or obstructs the prosecution or defense of a felony. Otherwise, tampering with
physical evidence is a Class B misdemeanor.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-53-111 (Michie Repl. 1997).
148. Goff, 342 Ark. at 149-50, 23 S.W.3d at 390-91.
[The complaint] does not allege that the logs would have shown that the driver of
the truck that struck Mrs. Goff had been on the road for more hours than federal law
permits. Therefore, even if [Goff] had been permitted to present [her] spoliation
claim to a jury, there would have been no way for that jury to tell what the logs
would have shown and what injury, if any, [Goff] had suffered as a result of the
logs' destruction.
Id. at 149,27 S.W.3d at 390-91.
149. Id. at 149-50, 27 S.W.3d at 391.
150. Abstract and Brief for Appellant at 39, Goff(No. 99-01420).
151. Goff, 342 Ark. at 150, 27 S.W.3d at 391. The court cited cases from Alabama,
Arizona, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Pennsylvania, and Texas in identifyingjurisdictions that refuse
to acknowledge the tort. It cited cases from Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, New
Hampshire, and Virginia in identifying jurisdictions that declined to reach the issue on facts
presented. Id., 27 S.W.3d at 391.
152. Id., 27 S.W.3d at 391.
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spoliation should be "properly frame[d] ... as an evidentiary concept, not a
separate cause of action," especially when creating such a tort would lead to
duplicative litigation and inefficient relitigation."' In sum, the Arkansas
Supreme Court closed the door on an independent cause of action based on
intentional spoliation by a party and found that existing sanctions provide
adequate remedies to the prejudiced party."
V. SIGNIFICANCE
Most would agree that intentional spoliation by a party-opponent is
wrong-it reduces the likelihood of accurate results in the judicial process's
search for truth and is unfair to the non-spoliating party's opportunity to seek
justice."' Furthermore, spoliation risks the integrity of a legal system that
serves to educate regarding substantive law and acceptable behavior, because
evidence destruction may leave underlying wrongful behavior unproven and
unpunished." However, in Goffv. HaroldIves Trucking Co.,157 the Arkansas
Supreme Court reasoned that recognizing spoliation as an independent tort
action was "unnecessary and unwise," and declared existing remedies
adequate to safeguard against the wrongs of spoliation.'58
Indeed, in refusing to recognize spoliation as an independent tort, courts
frequently cite to the "historically infrequent" need to address spoliation as
evidence that non-tort remedies suffice to deter this type of behavior. 59 But
are the courts as successful in controlling spoliation and fairness as they
presume? Some commentators suggest that incidents of spoliation are
common. " If so, the argument that the non-tort remedies are effective enough
is weakened. That practitioners are reminded of the risks of evidence
destruction,"" as well as advised to anticipate spoliation by an opposing
153. Id. at 151, 23 S.W.3d at 391 (quoting Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 951-52
(Tex. 1998)).
154. Id. at 150-51, 27 S.W.3d at 391.
155. GORELICK ET AL., supra note 32, at 14.
156. See id. at lS.
157. 342 Ark. 143, 27 S.W.3d 387 (2000).
158. Id., 27 S.W.3d at 387.
159. For example, the circuit judge stated in Goffthat in nineteen years he had never seen
a case that involved destroyed evidence, remarking that "[a] cause of action normally comes
about and is recognized because there is a requirement, a demand, for it .... But I've never
seen this before." Abstract and Brief for Appellant at 31, Goff (No. 99-01420) (quoting
Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss). See also Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior
Court, 954 P.2d 511, 518 (Cal. 1998) ("The infrequency of spoliation suggests that existing
remedies are generally effective at deterring spoliation.").
160. See, e.g., Nesson, supra note 120, at 793 (stating that "[ilnterviews and surveys of
litigators suggest [spoliation is] a prevalent practice").
161. See, e.g., Kindel & Richter, supra note 55, at 709-11. The authors provide guidelines
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party, 162 suggests that spoliation is not as infrequent an occurrence as one
might hope.
One must ask whether the threat of criminal prosecution is really a threat
at all. There are few, if any, reported cases of criminal prosecution for
spoliation in civil litigation. 63 To pursue such a remedy could risk depletion
of prosecutorial resources.'" Moreover, a conviction on a misdemeanor
charge may be minor when compared to a potential civil monetary award. 65
Furthermore, even if a criminal sanction deters a party from future spoliation,
it does nothing to compensate the victim of the spoliation.'"6
Regardless of whether one agrees with the proposition that every wrong
deserves a remedy, the suggestion that an already-full court docket is a
sufficient reason to refuse to grant spoliation an independent tort status does
not seem sufficient. Or is the "strong policy" against this new tort, in fact,
merely keeping with a pattern of balking at recognizing new types of torts? 67
Without an independent tort action, there exists one less weapon in the
fight for fairness. Such action is arguably the most intimidating, and perhaps
the only significant weapon for the victim of spoliation, because the remaining
for minimizing the risk of incurring penalties for spoliation, such as restricting access to items
and documents. Id.; see also Ortego & Vogel, supra note 31, at 261 (suggesting that products
liability attorneys incorporate spoliation-preventing procedures and safeguards into a litigation
checklist).
162. See, e.g., Michael Bowden, Tired Trucker Litigation Is on the Rise, But Inexperienced
Lawyers 'Leave Dollars on the Table', LAW. WKLY. USA, Feb. 19, 2001, at B1. Bowden
advises writing a certified letter informing a party of a claim, including a warning that failing
to preserve evidence will constitute spoliation. Id.
163. Kindel & Richter, supra note 55, at 700; see also Spencer, supra note 120, at 45
(suggesting that the application of obstruction of justice statutes "is often cumbersome and
ineffective by [its] very nature").
164. Kindel & Richter, supra note 55, at 700 (citing United States v. Lundwall, 1 F. Supp.
2d 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
165. Katz & Muscaro, supra note 120, at 54; see also Pati Jo Pofahl, Smith v. Superior
Court. A New Tort of Intentional Spoliation of Evidence, 69 MINN. L. REV. 961, 983 (1985)
(suggesting that an action in tort would prevent litigants from shielding themselves by
spoliating relevant evidence "safe in the knowledge that recrimination is limited to the remote
chance of a misdemeanor prosecution").
166. Katz & Muscaro, supra note 120, at 54; see also Pofahl, supra note 165, at 977
(suggesting that sole reliance on a criminal sanction fails to compensate the injured party).
167. See, e.g., Jackson v. Kelly, 345 Ark. 151,44 S.W.3d 328 (2001) (holding, subsequent
to Goffv. Harold Ives Trucking Co., 342 Ark. 143,27 S.W.3d 387 (2000), that the creation of
a new tort of tortious interference with an expected inheritance was unnecessary); Country
Comer Food & Drug, Inc. v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 332 Ark. 645,656,966 S.W.2d 894,
899 (1998) (stating that the court was "not of a mind to recognize this new tort" [of duress]);
Dalrymple v. Fields, 276 Ark. 185, 633 S.W.2d 362 (1982) (stating that Arkansas does not
recognize the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress). But see Jackson v. Cadillac
Cowboy, Inc., 337 Ark. 24, 986 S.W.2d 410 (1999) (finding a high duty of care on holders of
alcohol licenses and overturning a prior decision in holding that the sale of alcohol by a licensed
vendor to an already intoxicated individual is evidence of negligence).
2001]
UALR LAW REVIEW
remedies may have no direct impact on the aggrieved party. 68 Consider the
impact of Smith v. Superior Court,'69 for example. In Smith, the California
appellate court announced an action in tort for spoliation, making the
automobile dealership potentially liable for both compensatory and punitive
damages.1' ° Soon after the court's decision, the "lost" evidence was found,
giving the plaintiffs access to relevant, essential evidence in the underlying
claim.' l In exchange for the plaintiffs's dropping the spoliation and personal
injury charges against it, the dealership settled in principle, guaranteeing an
ultimate recovery of three million dollars." In the words of the plaintiffs'
attorney, "The recognition of the new tort ... had an almost instantaneous
remedial effect."' "
At first glance, Goff might seem a laudable opinion. By refusing to
recognize another tort cause of action, the court claims to be decreasing
litigation in an already overburdened court system, upholding strong policy
concerns, exercising caution in its decision-making, and controlling fairness
in the adversarial process. But in coming to this conclusion, did the court
overlook an important consideration-the egregious nature of evidence
destruction by a party who should anticipate litigation and who is served
with a formal demand for documents? Pairing the court's use of the more
restrictive "intentional destruction of evidence" definition of spoliation with
the fact that the suit was against a party to the underlying litigation, one
might wonder if the court adequately weighed all the variables. The reality
of this opinion may be that denial of the independent tort cause of action
leaves a party with an inadequate remedy for-and leaves a system with
insufficient deterrents to-intentional spoliation.
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168. Remedies such as criminal prosecution or discovery sanctions may punish the
spoliator, but any fines attached are not paid to the victim. As one author noted, "[Sipoliation
victims are left with jury instructions, legal inferences, and discovery sanctions. In some cases,
this is a powerful arsenal. In others, it is no weapon at all." Abeles & Tyson, supra note 122,
at 51.
169. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
170. Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 741 P.2d 124, 128 (Cal. 1987) (citing Smith v.
Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 128-29.
173. Chris Goodrich, Gone Today, Here Tomorrow, CAL. LAW., June 1984, at 15.
174. GORELICKETAL., supra note 32, at 140. "The explicit purpose of the spoliation tort
is to compensate victims of evidence destruction." Id.; see also id. at 14-18 (discussing the
general policies behind regulating the destruction of evidence and suggesting that adequate
deterrents to spoliation are critical).
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